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“The focus of  the Convent ion is  to  fac i l i tate  ‘paper less ’  means of  communicat ion by  
offer ing cr i ter ia  under  which they can become equivalents  of  paper  documents ,  but  the 
Convent ion is  not  intended to  a l ter  t radi t ional  ru les  on paper-based communicat ions or  
c reate  separate  substant ive  ru les  for  e lectronic  communicat ions.” 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Convention on the Use of 
Electronic Communications in International Contracts (CUECIC or Convention)2 was adopted on 23 
November 2005.3 Its essential objective is to establish uniform rules intended to “remove obstacles to the 
use of electronic communications in international contracts, including obstacles that might result from the 
operation of existing international trade law instruments, with a view to enhancing legal certainty and 
commercial predictability.”4 The Convention relies on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce 
(MLEC),5 which constitutes an e-commerce flagship project dating back to 1995. It also resembles 
UNCITRAL’s Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), in terms of scope of 
application, principles of statutory interpretation and declarations of variations by ratifying countries.6 
Unlike the CISG, which governs only sales of goods, the CUECIC covers all communications pertaining to 
the formation or performance of a contract – irrespective of its subject matter.7 Singapore is the first Asian 
country to accede to the Convention and the second country globally.8 Apart from the international aspect 
of such accession, Singapore also decided to implement some of the Convention’s provisions into 
domestic law. The resulting complications can serve as a note of caution to any state whose contract law 
– like that of Singapore – is based on the common law.  Accordingly, most of the observations made in 
this article remain valid for countries with similar jurisdictions.   
This article takes a critical look at the CUECIC. It argues that contrary to the declaration made in the 
opening quote above, the Convention does in fact alter classic rules of contract formation and creates a 
                                                
1 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Secretariat, “Explanatory Note on the United 
Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts”, para 48, available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/06-57452_Ebook.pdf [hereinafter Explanatory Note]  
2 Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracting, Nov. 23, 2005, U.N. Doc. A/60/21, 
Annex [hereinafter CUECIC].  
3 The Convention enters into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of six months after the date 
of deposit of the third instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, Article 23(1). As of 30 April 30, 
2011, the following countries signed the Convention: Central African Republic, China, Colombia, Iran, Lebanon, 
Madagascar, Montenegro, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka. Signing the convention only indicates an intention to consider its ratification rather 
than consent to be bound by it. Two countries have ratified it: Honduras and Singapore. See: 
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/electronic_commerce/2005Convention_status.html 
4 Explanatory Note, supra note 1, para.  45. 
5 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment 1996, with Additional Article 5 bis as 
Adopted in 1998, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.4 (1999), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/ 
electcom/05-89450_Ebook.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2012) [hereinafter UNCITRAL MLEC Guide]. 
6 For a detailed description of the procedural and international aspects of the CUECIC, see Charles H. Martin, “The 
UNCITRAL Electronic Contracts Convention: Will it be Used or Avoided?”, 17 Pace Int’l L. Rev. 261 (2005). 
7 See Sieg Eiselen, “The Interaction between the Electronic Communications Convention and the United Nations 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods”, in The United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic 
Communications in International Contracts 333 (A.H. Boss & W. Kilian ed., 2008). 
8 Singapore acceded to the Convention on 7 July, 2010. UNCITRAL, Status 2005 - United Nations Convention on the 
Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/ 
uncitral_texts/electronic_commerce/2005Convention_status.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2012). 
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separate regime for electronic transactions. Exposing some contradictions in the commentary 
accompanying the Convention, this article focuses on its implications for domestic contract law only.9 It 
does not aim to present a detailed one-by-one description of the Convention’s provisions or discuss its 
impact on the effectiveness or desirability, if any, of harmonization efforts in the area of international 
trade or contract law (electronic or otherwise). Assumedly, much of the critique that followed the CISG, 
especially regarding its uniform application,10 could be repeated here. The emphasis is not on how the 
Convention relates to other bodies of law on an international level but on how – in certain circumstances 
– it affects domestic contract law. It is impossible, however, to evaluate the impact of the Convention 
without evaluating the Convention itself. Logically, if any of its solutions or assumptions are inadequate, 
their impact will be disruptive rather that facilitating. The discussion commences with a brief explanation 
of the Convention’s goals, its scope and its underlying principles. Next, the “validation” of electronic 
transactions is presented alongside an evaluation of the (alleged) obstacles to e-commerce. The article 
proceeds with a brief critique of the harmonization efforts in the area of e-commerce and the creation of a 
parallel regime for electronic contracts. The implementation of some CUECIC provisions in Singapore’s 
Electronic Transaction Act 2010 is introduced. In particular, the interaction between traditional principles 
of contract law and the CUECIC “solutions” is illustrated on the basis of Article 10, which affects the time 
of contract formation. 
A DUALITY OF GOALS – A SOURCE OF CONFUSION 
The CUECIC amalgamates two related, yet separate goals. One is the removal of obstacles to electronic 
commerce in international instruments, the other is the facilitation of electronic contracting. It can be 
suspected that it is this duality of goals that constitutes the source of any difficulties in applying or, in 
fact, understanding, the provisions of the Convention. At the outset of the preparatory works each goal 
existed in parallel.11 The aim was to create an instrument that would “modernize” existing international 
conventions, particularly trade-related ones, which came into being before the advent of electronic 
communications. The reasoning was that it is easier to enact one convention to “update” multiple 
instruments rather than amending individual instruments separately. Seemingly, the declaration “to 
remove obstacles to electronic commerce” pertains to this very objective.  Concurrently, the Working 
Group also decided to prepare a new convention dealing with electronic contracting in general12 s– a goal 
much wider in scope than “updating” international instruments. As a result, the CUECIC modestly aims at 
alleviating problems in applying other conventions in an electronic environment while, at the same time, 
ambitiously regulating the process of electronic contract formation and performance.  
 
                                                
9 Most comments regarding the implementation of the CUECIC on a domestic level apply to any country whose 
contract law is based on common law.  
10 See generally Vivian Grosswald Curran, “The Interpretive Challenge to Uniformity”, 15 J.L. & Com. 175 (1995); 
Andrew Phang & Yeo Tiong Min, “The Impact of Cyberspace on Contract Law”, in The Impact of the Regulatory 
Framework on E-Commerce in Singapore 39, 56-57 (Seng Kiat Boon Daniel ed., 2002), available at 
http://www.lawnet.com.sg/legal/ln2/comm/PDF/The_impact_of_the_regulatory_framework_on_e_commerce_in_S
G.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).  
11 See UNCITRAL, “Legal Aspect of Electronic Commerce: Legal Barriers to the Development of Electronic Commerce 
in International Instruments Relating to International Trade”, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.94 (Feb. 11, 2002). 
12 See UNCITRAL, “Legal Aspects of Electronic Commerce: Electronic Contracting: Provisions for a Draft Convention”, 
U.N. doc. A/ CN.9/WG.IV/WP.95 (Sept. 20, 2001). 
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The first goal is reflected in Article 20, which offers to remove some of the legal obstacles to e-commerce 
under existing international instruments.13 It states that the provisions of the Convention apply to the use 
of electronic communications in connection with the formation or performance of a contract to which any 
of the number of conventions listed in Article 20 apply, such as the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention). Article 20 does not, however, formally 
amend any international convention, treaty or agreement and does not provide an authentic interpretation 
of any other international instrument.14 Its effect is that by ratifying the Convention, except as otherwise 
declared, a State automatically undertakes to apply its provisions to electronic communications exchanged 
in connection with any of the conventions listed in paragraph 1 of Article 20 or any other convention, 
treaty or agreement to which a State is or may become a contracting State.15 Interestingly – and this is 
where the two goals seemingly overlap - with regards to communications relating to contracts covered by 
other international instruments, the Convention also offers substantive rules that allow those instruments 
to operate in the electronic environment.16 It is those substantive rules that constitute the main source of 
problems and create uncertainty. It is unclear whether any substantive provisions concerning electronic 
contracting are in fact necessary for the application of other conventions. For example, the CUECIC will 
apply to enforcement lawsuits under the New York Convention. The latter requires an “original” arbitration 
agreement to be proffered for enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. Unquestionably, the replication of 
“originals” in the electronic environment is a welcome facilitation.17 It is not immediately apparent, 
however, how issues such as invitations to treat and the regulation of the time of contract formation assist 
in the operation of this instrument. Moreover, the existence or provision of “originals” is not a question of 
contract law but of evidence or procedure. The “formation or performance” of a contract18 requires neither 
paper nor originals or signatures. It appears that the goal of removing obstacles to electronic commerce in 
international instruments is not necessarily aligned with that of regulating electronic contracting. After all, 
these “obstacles” mainly pertain to the paper-based nature of some legal requirements. Substantive 
provisions regulating, for example, the time of contract formation, are of a different nature than those 
prescribing formal requirements. There is nothing inherently wrong with one international instrument 
having two separate objectives. Problems, however, will arise if the respective areas of regulation do not 
fully overlap.19 The regulation of electronic contracting may require different provisions (if any) than those 
aiming to “modernize” international instruments.  
                                                
13 The Italian delegation noted the  
(…) absence, among the international legal instruments surveyed, of an instrument for which the 
proposed omnibus agreement would reach its intended general purpose. All the surveyed legal 
instruments, in one way or another, seem to require either no action or a very specific action that 
could not be confined to the mere establishment of the principle of the electronic equivalent, 
whenever the terms “writing”, “signature” and “document” are used.  
UNCITRAL, “Legal Barriers to the Development of Electronic Commerce in International Instruments Relating to 
International Trade: Compilation of Comments by Governments and International Organizations”, para. 9, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.98 (July 17, 2002). 
14 Explanatory Note, supra note 1, para. 289. 
15 Id. para. 290; Of the international conventions listed in Article 20(1), Singapore is party to the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods. 
16 See UNCITRAL Working Group on Electronic Commerce on the Work, , Rep. on its 43d Sess., Mar. 15-19, 2004, 
para. 51, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/548 (Apr. 1, 2004). 
17 See CUECIC, supra note 2, art. 9(4) 
18 See id. art. 1. 
19 See, e.g., Explanatory Note, supra note 1, para. 287. It was pointed out that UNCITRAL should “identify common 
elements between removing legal barriers to electronic commerce in existing instruments and a possible convention 
on electronic contracting.” 
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Apparently, the drafters spent little time discussing the foundations of the CUECIC, going straight into a 
discussion of its detailed provisions.20 Work on the Convention was expedited by copying many of its the 
provisions from the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce (MLEC).21 A reading of the explanatory 
notes reveals a lack of a fully theorized framework relating not only to the Convention’s goals but also to 
the manner in which they are to be achieved. Sometimes the primary goal is described as the 
“international harmonization of law in the area of electronic commerce,”22 sometimes as “validati[ng] the 
use of electronic communications in international trade.”23 This underlying confusion is further reflected in 
statements, which describe the Convention as an instrument designed to adapt various laws to electronic 
commerce,24 whereas the title of the Convention and some commentary thereto state that it specifically 
applies to contract law only. “The law” encompasses statutory law, “judicially created law” and other 
procedural law.25 A broad interpretation of the term “law” also derives from the explanatory notes, which 
– speaking in a contractual context – refer to “the law that applies . . . in accordance with the relevant 
rules of private international law.”26 If, as its title suggests, the Convention pertains to communications 
relating to contracts, the impact of the Convention on such other law may not always be easy to 
determine.  
SCOPE: THE “ELECTRONIC ELEMENT” 
Further difficulties in applying the Convention will result from its extremely wide scope. According to 
Article 1, the CUECIC applies to the use of electronic communications in connection with the formation or 
performance of a contract between parties whose places of business are in different States. It governs 
communications related to an existing or future contractual relationship: from invitations to make offers 
and pre-contractual inquiries to notices of termination or subsequent amendments of a contract. 
“Electronic communications” connote communications made by means of “data messages,” which are 
defined as “information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, magnetic, optical or similar 
means, including, . . . electronic data interchange, electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.”27 The 
scope of the CUECIC is therefore very wide. It is not confined to an electronic manner of transmission but 
extends to situations where a contractual statement is stored in an electronic format such as where a CD 
is placed in an envelope and delivered by hand.28 Admittedly, with the exception of face-to-face dealings 
and exchanges of paper letters by traditional mail, practically all communications at a distance contain an 
“electronic element” as they involve the intermediation of computers and data networks.29 Consequently, 
almost all communications in international trade are caught within the ambit of the Convention.  
Interesting situations arise in the case of “mixed communications,” where only one transacting party 
avails itself of an electronic method of communication or where the contracting process involves both 
traditional and “electronic” methods. A contract may have been formed by traditional means but 
                                                
20 Dieter Hettenbach, Das Übereinkommen der Vereinten Nationen über die Verwendung elektronischer Mitteilungen 
bei internationalen Verträgen [The United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in 
International Contracts] 23 (2008). See also Francesco G. Mazzotta, “Notes on the United Nations convention on the 
Use of Electronic Communications in International Contract and its Effects on the United Nations Convention of 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods”, 33 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 251, 252 (2007) (observing that it 
took “only” six sessions to prepare the Convention). 
21 UNCITRAL MLEC Guide, supra note 5. 
22 Amelia H. Boss, “Introduction”, in The United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in 
International Contracts, supra note 7, at 1, 3. 
23 Id. at 4. 
24 Id. at 3. 
25 Explanatory Note, supra note 1, para. 139. 
26 Id. para. 141. 
27 CUECIC, supra note 2, art. 9 4 (b), (d). 
28 Explanatory Note, supra note 1, paras.  93, 95. 
29 Curt M. White, Fundamentals of Networking and Data Communications 351 (6th ed. 2011). 
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subsequent communications are conducted electronically.30 It is not clear whether a single electronic 
message would bring all preceding and subsequent communications within the scope of the CUECIC, even 
if they lack an electronic element or whether the Convention would apply to this single communication 
only. If the latter was the case, there could be transactions where some of the communications fall under 
the CUECIC regime whereas others are governed by traditional rules. If the former was the case, then the 
sending of a single email during negotiations otherwise conducted exclusively by traditional 
communications would trigger the applicability of the CUECIC and subsume all communications relating to 
the transaction under the modified regime. Consequently, the time of contract formation resulting from a 
classic exchange of letters (i.e. no electronic element) would still be evaluated on the basis of provisions 
which presume the electronic character of the interaction.  In sum, the breadth of the terms “electronic 
communications” and “data message” has some undesirable side-effects, such as having two different 
regimes applying to communications within the same transaction or subsuming traditional 
communications under an electronic regime.  
TECHNOLOGY NEUTRALITY AND FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE 
The CUECIC relies on the concepts of technology and media neutrality as well as on so-called functional 
equivalence.31 Technology neutrality means that the Convention covers “all factual situations where 
information is generated, stored or transmitted in the form of electronic communications, irrespective of 
the technology or medium used.”32 Its provisions are neutral in that they “do not presuppose the use of any 
technology in particular.”33 Although both media and technology neutrality are regarded as “guiding 
principles” and serve as important components of most arguments justifying the CUECIC’s solutions 
neither concept appears clear and fully conceptualized. Media neutrality is often difficult to distinguish 
from technological neutrality. Both refer to the alleged independence of legal principles from the 
technologies and media by means of which parties manifest agreement. Both assume that legal principles 
should withhold technological change and not lock the law into a particular technology. They also prohibit 
the discrimination of electronic methods of communication and prescribe treating them at par with 
traditional methods.  
Unquestionably, law should withhold technological change. There should be no need to regulate anew 
whenever a new communication method is introduced. In this sense, technology neutrality must be 
applauded.  It must be observed, however, that some legal principles may not be – by their very nature – 
technology neutral. After all, even the offer and acceptance model has developed around a specific 
method of communication: the post. Moreover, many legal principles implicitly presume the existence of 
paper as a physical carrier,34 i.e. they are not media neutral. It appears questionable whether there are two 
discrete concepts. Media neutrality may be regarded as a subset of technology neutrality as it relates to 
physical carriers only,35 whereas technology neutrality seems to be a broader concept referring to methods 
of transmission in general. If technology neutrality is not present in traditional contract law, should it serve 
as a guiding principle in the regulation of electronic contracting? If technology neutrality is understood as 
proclaiming the principle that the laws should apply identically irrespective of the technology used, then – 
why is there a need to have a convention governing electronic contracting? Should it not be possible to 
apply the existing laws in their present form? But, as indicated, existing laws may not be technology or 
media neutral. The notion of technology neutrality seems to lead to a circular argument. The solution to 
this theoretical conundrum will largely depend on how the exact scope of the Convention is defined: does 
                                                
30Hettenbach, supra note 20, at 41. 
31 Explanatory Note, supra note 1, paras. 46-53. 
32 Id. para. 47. 
33 Id. 
34 José Angelo Estrella Faria “Online Contracting: Legal Certainty for Global Business – The New U.N. Convention on 
the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts”, 39 UCC L.J. 25 (2006). 
35 Explanatory Note, supra note 1, para. 48. 
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it encompass contract law (or laws pertaining to contractual relationships) only or does it relate to “the 
law” in general. 
Interestingly, despite frequent declarations to the contrary, many of the Convention’s provisions that affect 
contract law are not technology neutral in the sense that they are either specifically tailored to a particular 
technology or presuppose specific technological features of a particular communication method. Most of 
the substantive provisions introduced to “facilitate electronic contracting” are in fact technology-specific. 
An example is Article 11 (Invitations to Make Offers), which states that:  
A proposal to conclude a contract made through electronic communications which is not 
addressed to one or more specific parties but is generally accessible to parties making use of 
information systems (including proposals that make use of interactive applications for the 
placement of orders through such systems) is deemed to be an invitation to make offers, 
unless it clearly indicates the intention of the party making the proposal to be bound in case 
of acceptance.  
Accordingly, a presumption is established that statements made on websites are not binding. It is unclear , 
however, why statements made on websites should interpreted differently than the statements made in 
newspapers or verbally. It is the content of a statement and the intention conveyed thereby – not the 
method of its communication, manner of expression or the number of addressees – that must be analyzed 
to determine its legal effect. Statements to the effect that such default rule creates “transparency in 
trading practices”36 fail to convince. It was argued that in accordance with the principle of media 
neutrality, “the solution for online transactions should not be different from the solution used for 
equivalent situations in a paper-based environment.”37 It cannot be overemphasized that no such 
presumption exists in the “paper-based environment.” The solution presented in the Convention is 
different.  Article 11 not only modifies traditional rules, but is tailored to specifically regulate contracts 
concluded on websites. 
Another cornerstone of the Convention is “functional equivalence.” Functional equivalence is discussed in 
relation to the fulfilment of formal requirements and the creation of electronic equivalents of paper-based 
concepts such as “writing” and “signatures.”38 Aiming to replicate real-world concepts electronically and 
to enable the uniform application of legal principles to all technologies and methods of communication, 
functional equivalence relies on an analysis of the “purposes and functions of the traditional paper-based 
requirement with a view to determining how those purposes or functions could be fulfilled through 
electronic-commerce techniques.”39 Upon closer analysis, however, it becomes apparent that functional 
equivalence is not only difficult to achieve but may indirectly contradict technology neutrality.40 Creating 
electronic equivalents of “writing” and “signatures” often results in a redefinition of the original concepts 
and in equipping them with qualities they do not originally possess. For example, Article 9, which 
establishes the requirements for functional equivalents of signatures, prescribes that electronic signatures 
not only indicate a party’s intention but also identify the signatory. This approach overlooks the fact that 
traditional signatures need not be legible and need not identify the signatory.41 Due to the liberal approach 
as to what can constitute a signature, neither a biometric link nor a name is required.42 Accordingly, the 
electronic equivalent of “signature” differs from the original concept as it presupposes a function that the 
                                                
36 Estrella Faria, supra note 34, at 11. 
37 Explanatory Note, supra note 1, para. 199. 
38 Id. para. 50. 
39 Id. para. 133. 
40 See generally Chris Reed, “Online and Offline Equivalence: Aspiration and Achievement” 18 Int’l J.L. & Info. Tech. 
248 (2010). 
41 Holly K. Towle, “E-Signatures – Basics of the US Structure”, 38 Hous. L. Rev. 921, 986 (2001). 
42 UNCITRAL MLEC Guide, supra note 5, para. 54. 
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original does not necessarily fulfil. Prescribing the criteria for a functional equivalent may also result in the 
imposition of a specific technology, if only one technology can fulfil these criteria. If the “electronic 
equivalent” of a signature must identify a person, only those technologies that can achieve such 
identification are admissible. This raises some complex issues pertaining to remote authentication and, 
possibly, the necessity of a biometric association, which is difficult to replicate in an electronic 
environment. Consequently, the co-existence of functional equivalence and technology or media neutrality 
appears questionable.  
Interestingly, functional equivalence seems to work only “one way:” it is rarely noted that many electronic 
phenomena do not have real-world equivalents. An example is hypertext, which disperses content among 
multiple files and often hides the very source of such content.43 Its characteristics are difficult to replicate 
– or even compare to anything – in the world of paper. The facilitation of e-commerce and the application 
of contract law principles to electronic transactions may not always require the creation of an electronic 
equivalent of a real-world concept (such as writing) but the finding of a real-world equivalent of a concept 
that exists only in the “electronic world.” On a more general level, it could also be said that if a legal 
principle is technology (or media-) neutral, functional equivalents are superfluous, as the principle should 
accommodate new communication methods without the need for separate constructs. Seemingly, the very 
regulation of electronic contracting contradicts technology neutrality as it implies that contracts formed by 
electronic means require separate treatment. Contracts are usually regulated due to their subject matter or 
the weaker position of one contracting party – not because of the manner they are formed.44 
VALIDATION AND REMOVAL OF OBSTACLES 
Article 8, titled “Legal recognition of electronic communications” proclaims: “[a] communication or a 
contract shall not be denied validity or enforceability on the sole ground that it is in the form of an 
electronic communication.” Consequently, the CUECIC prohibits (a) any discrimination on the basis that a 
contract originated in electronic form and (b) any disparity of treatment between electronic 
communications and paper documents.45 These prohibitions continue the theme of technology neutrality. 
At the same time, as indicated above, some provisions enhance such disparity by creating technology-
specific rules. The best example if the aforementioned Article 11, which contains a presumption that 
statements on websites are not legally binding. This presumption does not exist in relation to statements 
made in paper documents. This is done in the name of “enhancing certainty” and “removing obstacles” to 
electronic contracting. While it cannot be said that the electronic environment does not create any 
problems, it is incorrect to state that contract law contains any inherent obstacles to electronic commerce 
or that electronic contracting requires “validation.” This is, unfortunately, a common misunderstanding. A 
simple illustration is the process of contract formation. There are many ways of forming a contract: parties 
may negotiate orally, in writing or they may engage in specific conduct. In common law systems, such as 
Singapore,46 as long as there is consideration, certainty and an intention to create legal relations, the 
promises made during the formation process are binding and enforceable.47 The new transacting 
environment changes nothing in this regard: intention, consideration, as well as certainty, are required for 
                                                
43 Dan L. Burk, “Proprietary Right in Hypertext Linkages”, 1998 J. Info. L. & Tech, http://www2.warwick.ac. 
uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/1998_2 (last visited Jan. 15, 2012). 
44 Donnie L. Kidd, Jr. & William H. Daughtrey, Jr., “Adapting Contract Law to Accommodate Electronic Contracts”, 26 
Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J.  215, 269 (2000). 
45 Explanatory Note, supra note 1, para. 129. 
46 Singapore follows the common law of contract. See Application of English Law Act (Cap. 7A) (Rev. ed. 1994) 
(Sing.). 
47 The Law of Contract 255 (M Furmston ed., 4th ed. 2010). 
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contracts formed by electronic means and for contracts formed in traditional ways. Contract law generally 
disregards the manner in which intention is communicated.48  In the words of one author: 
[T]he existing rules and principles need not be changed, let alone replaced or abrogated. . . . 
[T]he difficulty is one of application rather than substantive content as such. This is, perhaps, 
not wholly surprising as, by their very nature, common law as well as equitable rules and 
principles will tend to be stated at a very general level of abstraction or universality, thus 
leaving much scope for actual as well as potential application to a large variety of contexts, 
including one as ostensibly radical as cyberspace.49 
Another popular misapprehension is that there exist many legal requirements prescribing the use of 
traditional paper-based documentation, which constitute a “significant obstacle to the development of 
modern means of communication.”50 It is, however, difficult to find such “legal requirements” in contract 
law, at least in common law countries. Formalities, such as writing or signatures, may be required by law 
(other than contract law)51 or by the contracting parties themselves. Contract law itself is “form-free.” The 
electronic form does not pose an obstacle to valid on-line transactions because the substantive rules of 
contract law permit intention to be manifested in any manner. There being no general requirement for 
contracts to be in writing or to be signed, formal requirements are an exception not the rule.52 Accordingly, 
the absence of “paper,” “writing” and “signatures” does not affect the validity or enforceability of 
contracts or pose an obstacle to their conclusion by means of emails, instant messengers or on websites. 
After all, “[i]f an oral agreement should suffice for the formation of a valid and binding contract, then 
surely an agreement reached with the use of electronic communications should be afforded the same 
recognition.”53 In sum, contracts can be formed and performed without any formalities.54  
The “problem” of formalities may be also analyzed from the perspective of the Convention’s second goal 
to facilitate the application of international instruments. The first convention that comes to mind is the 
CISG. However, in the words of one author, “[t]he issue of electronic communications in the context of the 
CISG has always been addressed through interpretation.”55 Given the absence of any form requirements in 
the CISG56 and the ease of its adaptation to the electronic environment,57 it is not immediately apparent 
how the CUECIC assists in its operation.58 A detailed reading of the CISG reveals that it can function 
without any adaptations and need not be supplemented with any additional rules to facilitate or validate 
electronic communications.59  
                                                
48 See Reed, supra note 40, at 256 
49 Phang & Yeo, supra note 10, at 40-41.  
50 Explanatory Note, supra note 1, para. 50. 
51 See, e.g., Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20 (U.K.); Civil Law Act (Cap. 43) (Rev. ed. 1985) (Sing.) 
52 The Law of Contract, supra note 47, at 559. See also Andrew Murray, Information Technology Law: The Law and 
Society 414 (2010). 
53 Eiselen, supra note 7, at 343. 
54 “As a general rule, no formalities are required for the creation of a contract in English law.” Stephen Smith & P.S. 
Atiyah, Atiyah’s Introduction to the Law of Contract 96 (6th ed. 2006). 
55 Juana Coetzee, “Securing the Future of Electronic Sales in the Context of International Sales”, 11 Vindobona J. Int’l 
Com. L. & Arb. 11, 14 (2007). 
56 Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 11, July 1, 1964, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
CISG]. Under the CISG, “writing” may be required if a country made a declaration to this effect under CISG art 96. 
57 CISG-Advisory Council Opinion No. 1, Electronic Communications Under CISG (Aug. 15, 2003), available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op1.html. See also Herbert Bernstein & Joseph Lookofsky, Understanding 
The CISG in Europe: A Compact Guide to the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods 38 (2d ed. 2003). 
58 Eiselen, supra note 7, at 342. 
59 Schlechtriem & Schwenzer: Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) 241 
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In light of the above it could be argued that some of the obstacles the Convention is trying to remove do 
not exist – at least not in contract law. Statements that contracts can be formed electronically merely 
state the obvious. A simple prohibition to discriminate on the basis of the “electronic” form would have 
sufficed. From a contract law perspective, there is no further need for validation, confirmation of 
effectiveness or admissibility. Declarations to the effect that the Convention “validates” electronic 
contracting are misleading in the sense that they imply that validation is needed in the first place. It must 
be re-emphasized that there is no reason to deny validity or legal effect to a statement or the resulting 
contract (if any) solely on the ground that it is in electronic form. This simple truth is also reflected in 
Clause 11(1) of the Electronic Transactions Act (ETA) “For the avoidance of doubt, it is declared that in the 
context of the formation of contracts, an offer and the acceptance of an offer may be expressed by means 
of electronic communications”. This wording constitutes a confirmation of an existing rule – not the 
creation of a new one.  
Leaving aside contract law, it must be acknowledged that existing legislation (including international 
instruments) may be inadequate or “outdated” in that it does not contemplate the use of electronic 
communications.60 It is true that new legislation, or an amendment of existing legislation, might be 
necessary to provide a legal infrastructure for electronic commerce.61 It is equally true, however, that the 
need to modernize legislation must be distinguished from the need to modernize contract law. “Updating” 
statues must be distinguished from “updating” contract law. This division is drawn in the New Zealand 
ETA, which is restricted in its application to requirements imposed by statute. In Singapore, the ETA 
applies to both “written law and common law:”62  Caution must therefore be exercised when evaluating 
statements that law lags behind the revolutionary developments in information technology. This statement 
is largely valid when it comes to some written laws, which contain provisions not easily amenable to a 
wide and flexible interpretation. The statement is not valid when it comes to “pure” contract law in 
common law systems such as England or Singapore.  
HARMONIZATION AND PARALLELISM 
Once acceded to, the Convention becomes part of national law but governs only international transactions. 
The regime created by the Convention remains separate and independent from the regime governing 
domestic transactions. Upon accession, a Contracting State is not obliged to implement the CUECIC at a 
domestic level. It is, however, possible to transpose some provisions into national regulations governing 
electronic commerce, usually referred to as “Electronic Transactions Acts.”63 This has been the case in 
Singapore and is also being planned in Australia,64 which seems next in line to accede to the Convention. 
It was argued that “while the Convention and . . . domestic laws operate in different dimensions or 
spheres of application, electronic commerce is best served by a body of law that is seamless and makes 
                                                                                                                                          
(Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 3d ed., 2010); Charles H. Martin, “The Electronic Contracts Convention, The CISG and New 
Sources of E-commerce Law”, 16 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 467, 475 (2008). 
60 Tana Pistorius, “Contract Formation: a Comparative perspective on the Model Law on Electronic Commerce”, 15 
Comp. & Int’l L.J. S. Afr. 129,130 (2002). 
61 Harry S.K. Tan, “The Impact of Singapore’s Electronic Transactions Act on the Formation of E-contracts”, 9 
Electronic Comm. L. Rev. 85, 85 (2002). 
62 Info-communications Development Authority (IDA) & Attorney-General's Chambers (AGC), “Joint IDA-AGC Review 
of the Electronic Transactions Act, Stage II: Exclusions from the ETA under Section 4”, LRRD No.2/2004, at 15, 16, 
http://www.ida.gov.sg/doc/Policies%20and%20Regulation/Policies_and_Regulation_ 
Level2/papers/ETA_Review_-_Exclusions_under_s_4_consultation_paper.pdf (last visited Jan 15, 2012). 
63 See Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) (Austl.). 
64 Attorney-General R McClelland introduced the Electronic Transactions Amendment Bill 2011 into the House of 
Representatives. Once the amendments are enacted in all jurisdictions, the Government will move to accede to the 
Convention. See Media Release, Attorney-Genreal for Austratlia, Updating Electronic Transactions Legislation (Feb. 
9, 2011) http://www.ag.gov.au/www/ministers/mcclelland.nsf/Page/MediaReleases_2011_ 
FirstQuarter_9February2011-Updatingelectronictransactionslegislation. 
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no distinction between local and international systems.”65 The problems inherent in cascading the CUECIC 
solutions to domestic law are particularly pertinent given ASEAN’s recommendation to use the Convention 
not only as a tool to harmonize e-commerce legislation on a regional level but also to apply its provisions 
in domestic transactions.66 The application of the Convention to international contracts must therefore be 
distinguished from situations, where a contracting state decides to amend or create domestic e-commerce 
laws to reflect its provisions. In the second instance, a number of legal solutions, which assume an 
international and strictly commercial character of the transaction, will apply to domestic transactions. 
Consequently, while achieving uniformity between international and domestic contract law, the 
implementation of the CUECIC solutions creates a division within domestic contract law, with special rules 
coming into operation whenever a transaction is concluded by electronic means.67 
Some critical observations are inevitable. Parallel regimes are tolerable and common at an international 
level. This is already the case in those countries, which adopted the CISG to govern international sales of 
goods. Although the CISG becomes part of domestic law, it only governs international transactions, i.e. 
contracts with a cross-border element. The solutions in the CISG do not affect domestic transactions. 
Accordingly, there is a difference between the set of rules governing domestic transactions and the set of 
rules governing international transactions. Reflecting a historical evolution of national legal systems there 
is no international uniformity in contract law at domestic level, i.e., every state has its own system of 
contract law. It is not immediately apparent why electronic contracting should be harmonized if traditional 
contracting is not. It is unclear why a new and untested legal instrument designed to govern international 
transactions should serve as a template for domestic law reform. It is also questionable whether the 
facilitation of e-commerce at an international level requires that e-commerce laws be harmonized at a 
national level.68 After all, the same could be said about contract law in general: one uniform international 
contract law that also applied to domestic transactions would facilitate worldwide trade and provide 
unprecedented legal certainty. This would happen if every country in the world adopted the CISG and 
subsequently amended its national laws to reflect its principles. This, however, is not the case as every 
country has its own, domestic contract law. Statements to the effect that ASEAN member countries 
should amend domestic electronic commerce and contract laws to be consistent with the CUECIC “to 
ensure that there is only one law for both domestic and international contracts”69 are therefore surprising 
and unrealistic.70 They seem to ignore that “the territoriality of laws will always be a real issue so long as 
sovereignty of independent states (and legal systems) remain.”71 Unquestionably, there is “a real danger 
that parties will be taken by surprise by differences in the legal treatment of their contracts which turn on 
                                                
65 Boss, supra note 22, at 7. 
66 Chris Connolly, “Using the Electronic Communication Convention to Harmonise National and International 
Electronic Commerce Laws: An ASEAN Study”, in The United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic 
Communications in International Contracts, supra note 7, at 315, 320. Please note that the term “harmonization” is 
used in the sense of “unififormization.” See generally Martin Boodman, “The Myth of Harmonization of Laws”, 39 
The Am. J. Comp. L. 699 (1991). 
67 Hettenbach, supra note 20.  
68 Connolly, supra note 66, at 316. See also Ter Kah Leng, “Towards Uniform Electronic Contracting Law”, 18 Sing. 
Acad. L.J. 234, 235 (2006) (stressing that it is undesirable to have two regimes, one for domestic and one for 
international contracts). 
69 Connolly, supra note 66, at 320. See also IDA & AGC, “Joint IDA-AGC Review of the Electronic Transactions Act, 
Stage 1: Electronic Contracting Issues”, LRRD No.1/2004, at 5, http://www.ida.gov.sg/doc/ 
Policies%20and%20Regulation/Policies_and_Regulation_Level2/IDA-AGC_electronic_contracting_issues/ 
ETA_Review_-_Electronic_Contracting_Issues_Consultation_Paper.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2012) (emphasizing that 
the aim was harmonization of how international contracts are entered into). 
70 For a general discussion of international conventions and the goal of uniformity, see Sir John Hobhouse, 
“International Conventions and Commercial Law: the Pursuit of Uniformity” 106 L. Q. Rev. 530, 530-35 (1990). 
71 Phang & Yeo, supra note 10, at 54, 56-57. The authors remained “sceptical of any efforts to harmonise substantive 
rules of contract law generally. The divergence of legal doctrines, cultures and traditions in different countries should 
not be underestimated.”  
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the characterization of their contracts as international or domestic.”72 The same danger exists in any 
international transaction where the fact that one of the parties is from a different jurisdiction is not 
immediately noticeable.  
Another important point must be made before proceeding. The Convention, while aiming to harmonize and 
streamline the international aspects of electronic contracting, is not directly designed to harmonize 
domestic electronic contracting or contract law in general. Quite the opposite: it is frequently emphasized 
that its provisions aim not to interfere with domestic contractual principles.73 Working Group IV itself 
emphasized that the Convention should not affect substantive contract law.74 Moreover, Article 19(2) 
permits States to exclude from the scope of the Convention any matters it may specify by means of a 
declaration.75 Article 19 has accumulated extensive critique as destroying the aim of certainty and 
uniformity in international electronic transactions.76 Both the “limited interference” and the mechanism in 
Article 19 specifically recognize the idiosyncrasies of national legal systems of the contracting States. It is 
therefore difficult to assume that the Convention requires, or envisages, general uniformity – both at the 
national and the international level. 
Harmonization aside, some broader questions come to mind: Should transactions concluded by electronic 
means be governed by a separate set of rules?  Is there a need for a parallel regime for electronic 
contracts? After all, any technology-related alteration of a principle of contract law spawns two separate 
regimes: one for contracts formed in a traditional manner, another for contracts formed electronically.77 
Interestingly, UNCITRAL was “mindful of the need to avoid creating a duality of regimes for contract 
formation: a uniform regime for electronic contracts under the new Convention and a different, not 
harmonized regime, for contract formation by any other means.”78 Despite such declarations, the 
Convention introduces substantive rules tailored to the electronic environment, which are inconsistent 
with the traditional principles. This is done “where substantive rules are needed in order to ensure the 
effectiveness communications”79 or to address “the potentially higher risk of mistakes being made in real-
time or nearly instantaneous transactions . . . with automated message systems.”80 These substantive 
rules are exemplified by Article 10 (time and place of dispatch and receipt of electronic communications), 
Article 11 (invitations to make offers), and Article 14 (errors in electronic communications). The surprising 
thing about these provisions is their very existence. By establishing rules that apply only when a 
communication is made by electronic means, these provisions do in fact create a separate regime. Their 
existence not only contradicts the principle of technology neutrality but runs counter to the many 
                                                
72 Chong Kah Wei & Chao Suling, “United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in 
International Contracts – A New Global Standard”, 18 Sing. Acad. L. J. 116, 145 (2006). 
73 See, e.g., Explanatory Note, supra note 1, para. 175. When preparing article 10 and debating whether electronic 
acceptances should be subject to rule of receipt or PAR,  
Different legal systems use various criteria to establish when a contract is formed and UNCITRAL 
took the view that it should not attempt to provide a rule on the time of contract formation that might 
be at variance with the rules on contract formation of the law applicable to any given contract (see 
A/CN.9/528, para. 103; see also A/CN.9/546, paras. 119- 121). 
 See also Explanatory Note, supra note 1, para. 130. 
74 UNCITRAL, “Draft Report of the Working Group on Electronic Commerce on the Word of Its 42nd Session: 
Addendum”, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.IV/XLII/CRP.1/Add.7 (Nov. 21, 2003). 
75 See Explanatory Note, supra note 1, paras.  284, 285. 
76 Coetzee, supra note 55, at 20; Mazzotta, supra note20 , at 265. 
77 The risks of establishing a dual regime, depending on the media being used, has also been a concern expressed by 
the International Chamber of Commerce. See UNCITRAL, “Legal Aspects of Electronic Commerce: Electronic 
Contracting: Provisions for a Draft Convention: Comments by the International Chamber of Commerce”, U.N. Dec. 
A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.96 (Dec. 11, 2001). 
78 Explanatory Note, supra note 1, para. 53. 
79 Id. para. 4. 
80 Id. para. 12. 
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declarations contained in the literature accompanying the CUECIC – such as “non-interference with 
domestic law” and, as mentioned above, avoidance of creating a duality of regimes.   
SINGAPORE – ACCESSION AND DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION 
In Singapore, the ETA81 was first enacted in July 1998 to provide a legal foundation for electronic 
signatures and to give predictability and certainty to contracts formed electronically. The same month 
Singapore acceded to the CUECIC,82 the ETA was repealed and re-enacted. The new ETA came into force 
on July 1, 2010.83 Accordingly, Singapore is not only the first Asian nation to accede to the CUECIC but 
also the first nation to implement some of its provisions at domestic level.84 It must be emphasized that 
the ETA is significantly wider in scope than the Convention.85 It addresses the legal aspects of electronic 
contracts as well as issues of authentication and non-repudiation, such as the use of specified security 
procedures (including digital signatures). Moreover,  the ETA governs the use of electronic 
communications in the public sector, the liability of network service providers and the development of 
remote authentication procedures relying on Public Key Infrastructures. The ETA applies to the 
interpretation of the written laws of Singapore,86 unless the context indicates otherwise.87   
Although the 2010 ETA largely retains the legal framework contained in the 1998 ETA it adds or amends 
certain provisions dealing with electronic contracting to ensure consistency with the Convention.88 The 
following paragraphs briefly introduce those provisions that are relevant to electronic contracting. The 
2010 ETA aims to align domestic e-commerce regulations with the Convention. All amendments are 
perceived as clarifications or necessary facilitations, without which e-commerce cannot flourish.  
T ime of Formation 
Clause 13 of ETA resembles Article 10 of the CUECIC and regulates when and where electronic 
communications are deemed to have been dispatched or received, thereby directly affecting the 
determination of the time a contract is formed. Article 10 states:  
(1) The time of despatch of an electronic communication is  
(a) the time when it leaves an information system under the control of the originator or 
of the party who sent it on behalf of the originator; or  
(b) if the electronic communication has not left an information system under the control 
of the originator or of the party who sent it on behalf of the originator, the time when 
the electronic communication is received.  
                                                
81 Electronic Transactions Act (ETA) (Cap. 88) (Sing.). 
82 Upon ratification, Singapore declared: The Convention shall not apply to electronic communications relating to any 
contract for the sale or other disposition of immovable property, or any interest in such property. The Convention shall 
not apply in respect of (i) the creation or execution of a will; or (ii) the creation, performance or enforcement of an 
indenture, declaration of trust or power of attorney,that may be contracted for in any contract governed by the 
Convention. 
83 IDA, Policies& Regulation: Electronic Transaction Act, http://www.ida.gov.sg/Policies%20and%20 
Regulation/20060420164343.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2012). 
84 Singapore was also the first country to enact an Electronic Transaction Act in response to the 1996 Model Law. 
85 For a more detailed discussion about the differences between the Convention and the 1998 ETA, see Chong & 
Chao, supra note 72. 
86 E.g. Unfair Contract Terms Act (Cap. 396) (Sing.); Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act (Cap. 53B) (Sing.) 
87 IDA & AGC, “Joint IDA-AGC Review of the Electronic Transactions Act Proposed Amendments”, para. 2.16.3 (June 
30, 2009), available at http://www.ida.gov.sg/doc/Policies%20and%20Regulation/Policies_and_ 
Regulation_Level2/20060424112136/ETA_RR%2830June09%29.pdf. 
88 Id. para 2.3.6 
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(2) The time of receipt of an electronic communication is the time when the electronic 
communication becomes capable of being retrieved by the addressee at an electronic 
address designated by the addressee.  
(3) The time of receipt of an electronic communication at an electronic address that has 
not been designated by the addressee is the time when the electronic communication 
becomes capable of being retrieved by the addressee at that address and the addressee 
becomes aware that the electronic communication has been sent to that address.  
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3), an electronic communication is presumed to be 
capable of being retrieved by the addressee when it reaches the electronic address of 
the addressee. (…)  
Before proceeding it must be noted that absent specific provisions in a contract, the governing law is 
frequently determined by the rules of private international law.89 The latter require the establishment 
when and where the contract is concluded. Pinpointing the moment of contract formation is therefore of 
crucial importance. Interestingly, the Convention applies when a transaction is governed by the law of a 
Contracting State.90  When transposed into domestic law, the provisions of Article 10 will therefore 
overlap with the traditional rules of determining the time of formation – and directly affect the very 
question whether the CUECIC governs the transaction.  
It is trite law that a contract is formed when an acceptance becomes effective. Effectiveness is generally 
tied to receipt (the receipt rule) or to dispatch (the exception, called the postal acceptance rule).91 In 
traditional communications courts spend little time determining the exact moment of formation or defining 
the words “dispatch” and “receipt,” as there is usually only one place or one machine that must be taken 
into consideration. In electronic communications there may be two machines on each side of the 
transmission channel and therefore two potential points of contract formation. What does “dispatch” and 
“receipt” mean in the electronic environment? Defining these terms must at all times be distinguished 
from determining whether acceptances communicated by electronic means become effective on receipt or 
on dispatch. Given that the choice between the principle and the exception remains one of the more 
contentious issues in “e-commerce law”92 the establishment of a definitive rule would have provided some 
much anticipated certainty. The more so, that the CISG already does so.93 Regrettably, the question 
remains unresolved as UNCITRAL decided not to provide a rule that “might be at variance with the rules 
on contract formation” in the applicable national law.94  
The difficulties of defining “dispatch” and “receipt” are best illustrated by email, which involves the 
sender’s mail-client and outgoing mail-server and the addressee’s incoming mail-server and mail-client. 
The exact time of formation depends on whether the server or the client is considered relevant.95 There 
may be substantial delays between the time messages enter the server and the moment they are 
                                                
89 Explanatory Note, supra note 1, paras.  6, 65; Justin Hogan-Doran, “Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: the When and 
Where of On-line Contracts”, 77 Austl. L.J. 377 (2003).   
90 CUECIC, supra note 2, art. 20. 
91 Henthorn v Fraser [1892] 2 Ch 27; Dunlop v Higgins (1848) 1 HLC 381; Adams v Lindsell (1818) B & Ald 681. 
92 Peter Goodrich, “The Posthumous Life of the Postal Acceptance Rule” (Benjamin N Cardozo School of Law, Working 
Paper No 127, 2005); Hogan-Doran, supra note 89; Simone Hill, “Flogging A Dead Horse – The Postal Acceptance 
Rule and Email” 17 J. Cont. L. 151 (2001); Valerie Watnick, “The Electronic Formation of Contracts and the Common 
Law ‘Mailbox Rule’”, 56 Baylor L. Rev. 175 (2004); Paul D. Fasciano, Internet Electronic Mail: A Last Bastion for the 
Mailbox Rule, 25 Hofstra L. Rev. 971 (1997). 
93 CISG, supra note 56, art. 18(2). 
94 Explanatory Note, supra note 1, para. 175. 
95 Technically, servers and clients are processes, not discrete pieces of machinery. In many instances their separation 
is only logical. 
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downloaded to the client. Mail-clients are on the parties’ computers and therefore under their control.96 
Mail-servers, however, are usually operated by Internet Service Providers (ISPs). In traditional 
communications, telecommunication carriers and the post are regarded as independent third parties which 
provide the communication infrastructure.97 Receipt is generally associated with the arrival of a message 
at the addressee’s machine.98 When the exception applies, “transmission” commences when letters are 
placed in the mailbox, which constitutes part of the postal system. The time of formation may vary 
significantly depending on whether the ISP is treated like the post and the mail-server like a mailbox or 
whether the ISP is treated transparently, i.e., as belonging to the sphere of the control of each respective 
contracting party. The second option seems more correct: ISPs cannot be regarded as independent third 
parties and therefore mail-servers cannot be treated like traditional mailboxes. Each contracting party 
remains in a contractual relationship with its ISP and – despite having no actual technical control over the 
mail-server – must assume the perils of its malfunctioning. To claim otherwise would place the risks of 
operation of the sender’s outgoing mail-server on the addressee and the risk of operation of the 
addressee’s mail-server on the sender. This would defy logic and disregard the fact that each party (a) 
chose to use an ISP and (b) chose the particular ISP. After all, the latter provides a service that, technically, 
could be undertaken by the parties themselves. Only if Internet connectivity and mail-servers were 
provided by a universal telecommunications provider, such “ISP” would bear resemblance to the post.99 
Hence, it appears correct to regard the client and the server as one unit and disregard message transfers 
between mail-clients and mail-servers as well as the ISP’s actual technical control over the mail-server.   
According to Article 10, “dispatch” occurs when a message leaves an information system under the 
control of the originator. “Receipt” takes place when a message reaches the addressee’s electronic 
address, which is deemed to occur when it becomes capable of being retrieved by the addressee. Apart 
from the vagueness of the term “information system,” which denotes the “entire range of technical means 
used for transmitting, receiving and storing information”100 and the lack of any indication regarding the role 
of intermediaries101 (such as ISPs), additional complications derive from the division into “designated” and 
“non-designated” electronic addresses. Article 10 seems to emphasize the actual control of the 
communication infrastructure thereby disassociating the ISP from the contracting party. Its verbatim 
reading implies that it is the mail-client that must be taken into account when determining the moment of 
dispatch. At the same time, “receipt” is associated with “availability for retrieval,” which points to the 
addressee’s mail-server. Consequently, the mail-server is separated from the mail-client in the case of 
dispatch but treated as one device for the purposes of receipt: dispatch occurs when a message leaves the 
mail-client but is received when it reaches, or enters, the mail-server! It can be assumed that Article 10 
does very little in “clarifying” the law or transposing existing principles onto an electronic environment. 
Instead, it superimposes an additional layer of uncertainty regarding the actual application of the 
provision. Supplementing the traditional rules of establishing the time of formation with the provisions 
proposed by Article 10 will not necessarily result in enhancing the predictability of electronic transactions.  
INVITATIONS TO TREAT 
Clause 14, like Article 11 of the CUECIC, establishes the default rule that an electronic communication 
proposing to conclude contracts, which is addressed to the world at large, constitutes an invitation to 
make offers (i.e., invitations to treat), unless it clearly indicates the intention of the party making the 
proposal to be bound. As already discussed above, the provision contained in Article 11 is not only tailored 
                                                
96 I disregard whether the sender uses a shared computer and whether the mail-client takes the form of a browser, as 
in the case of web-mail, or a dedicated email application, such as Outlook. 
97 Fasciano, supra note 92, at 995. 
98 Tenax Steamship Co Ltd v Owners of the Motor Vessel “Brinmes” (The Brinmes), [1974] 3 All ER 88, 93. 
99 George B. Delta, Jeffrey H. Matsuura, Law of the Internet, paras. 3-10 (2008). 
100 Explanatory Note, supra note 1, para. 101. 
101 Id. para.  99. 
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to websites but also creates a presumption that does not exist in traditional contract law. To repeat: 
whether a statement is binding or not, is solely a question of intention – not manner of expression or 
method of communication. It is interesting to observe the inconsistency in approach: on some occasions, 
such as establishing a firm rule regarding when an electronic acceptance becomes effective, any 
regulation is avoided for fear of creating two separate regimes. On other occasions, technology-specific 
modifications, such as those contained in Clause 14, are introduced without hesitation. Interestingly, the 
relevant consultation paper stated that “the best approach to the issue would be to allow normal contract 
law rules to prevail” and therefore not to adopt any provisions concerning this issue.102 It remains unclear 
why the drafters regarded certain problems as worthy of creating technology-specific rules, whereas 
others (such as meeting disclosure requirements) completely passed under their radar.  
AUTOMATION 
Copying CUECIC Article 12, Clause 15 asserts that contracts formed through the use of automated systems 
(e.g., transactions on websites) are valid and enforceable, even though no natural persons had reviewed 
the action of the systems or output of its operations. Article 12 states: 
A contract formed by the interaction of an automated message system and a natural person, 
or by the interaction of automated message systems, shall not be denied validity or 
enforceability solely on the ground that no natural person reviewed or intervened in each of 
the individual actions carried out by the automated message systems or the resulting 
contract.  
Allegedly, such provision is necessary to “give legal effect to the acts of electronic agents, which are 
increasingly used in e-commerce.”103 While this provision does not modify any existing rule and is unlikely 
to cause much confusion, its existence can be regarded as redundant. There is no need to “validate” 
automated electronic transactions just as there was no need to confirm the possibility to form contracts by 
means of vending machines. In Thornton Shoe Lane Parking104 the court stated that the machine was only 
a presenter of the defendant’s offer. By initiating the computer, operators accept that contracts concluded 
by the computer are binding on them.105 This is a direct result of the principle that intention can be 
manifested in any manner and that such intention persist as long as a computer is held out. Contract law 
is indifferent to the fact that a message was not only transmitted but also generated by a computer. From 
the objective perspective of a reasonable addressee - the statement is the same. 
ELECTRONIC MISTAKE 
An interesting concept is introduced by Clause 16 of ETA, which follows CUECIC Article 14. The latter 
provides that 
(1) Where a natural person makes an input error in an electronic communication 
exchanged with the automated message system of another party and the automated 
message system does not provide the person with an opportunity to correct the error, 
that person, or the party on whose behalf that person was acting, has the right to 
withdraw the portion of the electronic communication in which the input error was 
made.  
                                                
102 IDA & AGC, supra note 87, para. 2.8.3. 
103 Ter, supra note 68, at 244. 
104 Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1971] 2 QB 163. 
105 Tom Allen & Robin Widdison, “Can Computers Make Contracts?”, 9 Harv. J. L. & Tech 25, 46 (1996); Margaret 
Jane Radin, “Humans, Computers and Binding Commitment”, 75 Ind. L. J. 1125, 1128 (2000). 
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(2) Subsection (1) shall not apply unless the person, or the party on whose behalf that 
person was acting  
(a) notifies the other party of the error as soon as possible after having learned of the 
error and indicates that he made an error in the electronic communication; and  
(b) has not used or received any material benefit or value from the goods or services, if 
any, received from the other party.  
(3) Nothing in this section shall affect the application of any rule of law that may govern 
the consequences of any error other than as provided for in subsections (1) and (2).  
The above provision allows for electronic communications to be withdrawn in the event an input error is 
made by a natural person interacting with an automated message system in the event the system does not 
allow the person to correct the error. Withdrawal can only occur if certain conditions are met, e.g., the 
natural person has not received any benefit from the transaction. The relevant provision does not provide a 
right to “correct” the error. Under the common law position, the contract would be allowed to stand unless 
the mistake or error must have been obvious to the reasonable party.106 While the desirability of such 
provision cannot be questioned in limited circumstances, such as consumer protection legislation, the 
general principle established therein must be applied with caution. Leaving aside the obvious observation 
that the provision differs from the classic principles of contract law thereby creating a parallel regime for 
automated transactions, its main weakness lies in the absence of any statement regarding the legal 
effects of the withdrawal. Assumedly, whether it would invalidate the entire transaction depends on the 
nature of the portion withdrawn. It is therefore questionable whether such piecemeal regulation 
introduces any certainty. As in the case of defining “dispatch” and “receipt,” it can add an additional layer 
of complexity to the traditional analysis. This complexity will derive from the difficulties in interpreting the 
provision and from its interaction with the principles of contract law. 
F INAL OBSERVATIONS  
A closer look at the Convention reveals that some of its provisions are prone to introduce further 
uncertainty into an already complex legal area. The provisions which govern electronic contracting not only 
contradict technology neutrality, but introduce a parallel contractual regime for contracts formed via 
modern means of communication. Whether the existence of such distinct set of rules is desirable, 
constitutes a separate question. It can only be assumed that declarations to the effect that “a duality of 
regimes must be avoided,” should have resulted in an instrument with fewer (if any) substantive rules. 
After all, the introduction of any provision that interferes with or alters the classic principles of contract 
law inevitably creates a dual regime. Such “duality” is particularly dangerous when the substantive 
provisions of the CUECIC are implemented into local e-commerce regulations. It is one thing to have two 
separate sets of rules for domestic and for international contracts. It is yet another to have a 
differentiation in legal treatment within domestic contract law. A verbatim implementation of the CUECIC 
results in a separate set of contractual rules, which apply only when a particular manifestation of intention 
is transmitted or stored electronically.  
Some might question whether the domestic implementation of the CUECIC’s substantive provisions really 
carries the dangerous side-effects indicated above. Responding to such doubts, it must be borne in mind 
that the process of contract formation, i.e., the initial transacting stages, including negotiations and 
invitations to make offers, affects the contents of the contract, the time of formation and the contract’s 
very existence. These initial stages are therefore particularly vulnerable to any interference. Even the 
smallest inconsistency in the formulation of a provision or a minute change in the applicable default rules 
will send ripple effects across the whole regime of contract law. Any additional complication, such as the 
application of one of the new provisions of the ETA, will result in increased uncertainty.  
                                                
106 Chwee Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2004] SGHC 71 (Sing.). 
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In light of the above, care must be taken not to be misled by the Convention’s rhetoric of “removing 
obstacles” or “facilitating” international electronic commerce. The latter would be best served by a 
Convention without any substantive provisions. Leaving aside the question whether its existence 
contributes to enhancing predictability in international electronic transactions, its implementation at a 
domestic level must be approached with great caution – if not avoided altogether. One must also remain 
skeptical about any efforts to harmonize substantive rules of contract law at a national level.107  
Despite the title of the Convention and the declaration made in Article 1, which refers to communications 
related to contracts only, the Convention potentially regulates the entire transactional landscape 
pertaining to contracts, such as statutory requirements and questions of evidence. Some provisions do not 
directly relate to contract law but are restricted to and necessary for the modification of international 
instruments. The initial differentiation between the two separate goals the Convention was designed to 
achieve must therefore be kept in mind.  
Legislation resembling the Singaporean ETA should aim at modernizing individual statutes that may 
contain provisions which are incompatible with technological progress. Such statutes may therefore need 
to be modernized. Specific contractual issues should, however, be left to common law developments. After 
all, no international conventions were necessary to adapt contract law to the post or telephone. The latter 
methods of communication, although at the time of their introduction they appeared quite revolutionary, 
were easily absorbed into contract law. It cannot be denied that some uncertainty is always present when 
applying the principles of contract law to novel transacting scenarios – such as those encountered in 
electronic transactions. Frequently, this uncertainty is the result of a general discomfort with the 
communication technology in question – not the existence of any obstacles to its use in electronic 
transactions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
107 Phang & Yeo, supra note 10, at 54. 
